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Abstract
We generalize Merton’s asset valuation approach to systems of multiple financial
firms where cross-ownership of equities and liabilities is present. The liabilities,
which may include debts and derivatives, can be of differing seniority. We derive
equations for the prices of equities and recovery claims under no-arbitrage. An
existence result and a uniqueness result are proven. Examples and an algorithm
for the simultaneous calculation of all no-arbitrage prices are provided. A result on
capital structure irrelevance for groups of firms regarding externally held claims is
discussed, as well as financial leverage and systemic risk caused by cross-ownership.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Preliminaries
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate and overcome the intricacies of deter-
mining no-arbitrage prices for the equities and the liabilities of a group of firms where
the financial fates of these firms are intertwined through the cross-ownership of financial
assets issued or guaranteed by the same firms. In this theory, the liabilities can include
debt and derivatives, and the claims belonging to these liabilities are allowed to have
differing priorities in a potential liquidation.
On the one hand, the problem of no-arbitrage pricing under cross-ownership is real,
and very important to consider, since cross-ownership of financial assets is present in
the world’s financial markets. For instance, McDonald (1989) writes that in 1987 double
counting from cross-ownership of equity (also called “reciprocal ownership”, “corporate
cross-holding”, or “intercorporate shareholding”) accounted for “at least 24% of Japan’s
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reported market capitalization.” An article by Bøhren and Michalsen (1994) shows at
the example of the Oslo stock exchange how equity cross-ownership can lead to double
counting of assets and overstated market equity. Ritzberger and Shorish (2002) state “that
under cross-ownership the book value of a firm will tend to be overestimated with respect
to the underlying cash flows.” Bøhren and Michalsen (1994) also show that financial
leverage can be understated due to cross-ownership. Furthermore, given the evidence
from more recent events in global financial markets, not only the danger of overstated
market aggregates, but also the very real risk of financial contagion seems to at least
partially stem from cross-ownership. However, especially in this context of systemic risk,
cross-ownership should not only be considered for equities, but also for liabilities like
bonds and derivatives issued by the considered firms.
On the other hand, the topic of financial cross-ownership is essentially non-existent in
the literature of financial mathematics as far as asset valuation models, credit risk models,
and derivatives pricing are concerned. In financial economics, or finance in general, cross-
ownership is considered, but mostly in conjunction with the separation of ownership from
the control of firms (e.g. in Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis (2000), Ritzberger and
Shorish (2002), Dorofeenko et al. (2008), and references therein), or with respect to the
distortion of market aggregates (e.g. McDonald (1989), Bøhren and Michalsen (1994), and
references therein). Because of this, the focus of cross-ownership considerations in financial
economics primarily lies on equity. This, however, is insufficient from a mathematical
finance point of view, because it neglects aspects of liabilities like debt or derivatives,
where cross-ownership can play a substantial role in the context of asset valuation under
counterparty risk.
It is indeed somewhat surprising that mathematical finance has neglected the area
of cross-ownership, since, for instance when trying to assess the credit-worthiness of a
financial firm, one of the natural questions to ask would be: what does it mean for the
balance sheet of company A if company B defaults on its debt, given that A owns parts of
B’s debt and maybe even some of its equity? Also, how severely are the financial promises
of A (debt or derivatives issued by A) affected when B defaults? For a larger number of
firms that are intertwined by cross-ownership, these kind of questions can quickly become
very complicated. As Ritzberger and Shorish (2002) write in the context of separation of
ownership from the control of firms:
[...] The precise quantitative effect of cross-ownership between firms is, how-
ever, difficult to capture, both at the theoretical and the empirical level. [...]
[...](“A owns part of B, B owns part of A, so A owns part of B’s ownership
of A, which is also part of a part of A’s ownership of B, which is...”). This
recursion must be addressed, [...]
In our context of asset valuation, the “recursion” Ritzberger and Shorish write about
could be thought of as a self-feeding financial feedback loop – potentially a financial
vicious circle. For instance, in the earlier example, the deterioration of A, that was
originally caused by B, could damage the financial status of B even further. It is clear
that these kind of scenarios have to be considered when it comes to pricing financial assets.
The questions asked above go straight to the core of a very important and very timely
problem: financial contagion and, indeed, systemic risk.
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1.2 Asset valuation models
To understand why cross-ownership has virtually never been considered in mathematical
finance, one needs to have a closer look at modern credit risk models. The reason for this
is that Merton’s asset valuation model, also called the Merton model (Black and Scholes
(1973), Merton (1973, 1974)) and its offspring today are mostly used in the context of
credit risk management.
Merton’s model, where equity and debt are considered as derivatives of an underlying
value process of the firm’s assets, inspired many extensions and refinements. These models
are usually summarily called structural models, also “firm-value models” or “threshold
models”, since they attempt to value assets by modelling the financial structure of the
considered companies. In these credit risk models, a credit event is usually triggered when
the assets (the “firm value”) of a company fall below a certain threshold – in Merton’s
case the nominal amount of outstanding debt. This fundamental idea is the basis of
a plethora of models that aim to improve the original Black-Merton-Scholes approach.
Already Merton (1974) includes coupon paying bonds and explains how to incorporate
stochastic interest rates. Further models that extend the original idea to stochastic interest
rates, differing liabilities, differing maturities, counterparty risk (“vulnerable options”),
and jump diffusion exist - including multi-firm models. It is far beyond the scope of this
paper to give a comprehensive overview of these models. For a summary of the literature
we refer to standard textbooks like Bingham and Kiesel (2004), as well as the references
therein.
In contrast to the structural approaches, so-called reduced-form models attempt to
model credit risk and especially default rates (therefore also the name “default rate mod-
els”) in a more statistical way, usually by assuming independence of credit events condi-
tional on certain underlying stochastic factors. For an overview over credit risk models
and over structural versus reduced-form models see for instance Crouhy, Galai and Mark
(2000) and Arora, Bohn and Zhu (2005), or textbooks like Bingham and Kiesel (2004). In
general, it is clear that default rate models are less useful if asset valuation (rather than
credit risk management) for a broad spectrum of assets and liabilities is the main goal.
While the Black-Merton-Scholes approach is the basis of modern structural credit risk
models (the model of Moody’s KMV (cf. Arora, Bohn and Zhu (2005) and Kealhofer
and Bohn (2001)) possibly being the commercially most successful one), a rupture in
the rationale of structural approaches seems to appear as soon as multiple firms are
considered. While at the level of the individual firm the blueprint of the Merton model is
usually clearly visible, at the multi-firm or inter-firm level, structural appproaches seem
to not get any consideration at all. For instance, models like the one of Moody’s KMV
seem to not go far beyond modelling correlations (cf. Kealhofer and Bohn (2001)) or, more
generally, multivariate distributions for the firms’ underlying assets. Such dependencies
between assets certainly lead to dependencies between the firms’ default events when the
original Black-Merton-Scholes idea is then applied to the individual firm – which is that
default is triggered when the assets of the company fall below a certain level. However, it
is obvious that such approaches do not attempt to model the actual ownership or cross-
ownership structures that possibly contribute to the observed credit event correlations.
In this sense, it is possibly fair to say that structural models turn reduced-form at the
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multi-firm or inter-firm level.
Before moving on to the next section, in the context of contagion at the two-firm
level, i.e. regarding counterparty risk or “vulnerable options”, there are certainly many
papers considering this problem. For instance, see Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) and the
references therein. Regarding financial contagion at a larger scale, it should be mentioned
that there are articles on credit risk that focus especially on modelling credit contagion
(e.g. Horst (2007)). However, the question of (and the role of) multi-firm, multi-liability,
and multi-priority cross-ownership is generally not addressed in these papers.
1.3 General liabilities under cross-ownership
While the focus of the Merton model and its (structural) sucessors lies on credit risk, this
is not the main focus of this paper. Let us assume that we had a ‘correct’ model of all
considered firms’ financial structures which was also correctly describing the inter-firm
structures in the form of cross-ownership – cross-ownership not only of equity, but also of
general liabilities that besides debt could be in the form of derivatives that had been issued
by or that were guaranteed by these firms. One would expect that such a ‘correct’ model
should not only make it possible to model credit events more precisely. Additionally,
better pricing of equities and liabilities in general should be possible. Similarly, it should
be possible to properly value an issued derivative including any counterparty risk present.
In reality, and in contrast to most existing models, liabilities can be of differing se-
niority. The seniority of a liability, or the priority of the corresponding financial claim,
defines the order of repayment in a potential liquidation event. For instance, senior debt
must be paid before subordinate debt, where subordinate debt itself can again be ranked
by so-called tiers. In general, equity in the form of common stock is subordinate to
other liabilities, i.e. equity is the “residual claim”. It is therefore clear that the proper
incorporation of the seniority of liabilities is important when it comes to valuation.
The general liabilities mentioned above should not only include debts or simple finan-
cial derivatives. In general, a liability could be any properly defined financial commitment.
For example, it could be the (naked) short-sale of another asset or financial claim, a liabil-
ity or a guarantee related to a mortgage-backed security, as well as an insurance liability.
For instance, Walsh (2009) writes in The New York Times:
[...] A.I.G.’s individual insurance companies have been doing an unusual vol-
ume of business with each other for many years – investing in each other’s
stocks; borrowing from each other’s investment portfolios; and guaranteeing
each other’s insurance policies, even when they have lacked the means to make
good. [...]
Here would be a real life situation where cross-ownership was (or is) possibly not only
present in equities, but also in insurance liabilities or derivatives thereof – additionally
to any other financial liabilities present, e.g. in the form of derivatives contracts with
firms outside A.I.G. As far as not obvious anyway, this case clearly shows that cross-
ownership is not only an issue in national Asian or European markets (cf. McDonald
(1989) for Japan, Bøhren and Michalsen (1994) for Norway; also compare the concept
of the Deutschland AG, a historic network of cross-ownership or “capital entanglement”
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among Germany’s blue chip companies (cf. Ho¨pner and Krempel (2003))), but it can
very much also be an issue within a conglomerate of firms or within a holding company.
As such, cross-ownership issues should have a very high priority for any regulator or
regulatory framework like Basel II or Solvency II.
The importance of cross-ownership goes beyond the examples mentioned so far. Cross-
ownership is present in more markets and at more levels than first meets the eye. For
instance, consider a houseowner who serves a mortgage on her house. We can consider the
houseowner as a financial firm, where the house is possibly the largest part of the assets,
and the mortgage possibly is the main liability. Like a firm, the houseowner has a limited
liability (at least in the U.S.) since she could declare personal bankruptcy or default on her
mortgage should her total assets become worth less than her total liabilities. Assume now
that the mortgage holder also owns a portfolio of stocks, for instance through her pension
fund. Furthermore assume that the mortgage was arranged by a major investment bank,
was sliced and packed into a mortgage-backed security which was sold by the investment
bank, possibly together with a guarantee against default. It is now not at all beyond
imagination that the pension fund of our mortgage holder not only owns shares in the
mentioned investment bank, but maybe it also holds mortgage-backed securities that
might include our homeowner’s mortgage, plus guarantee. On a nationwide or even global
scale, it is therefore entirely imaginable that homeowners who owe a mortgage might in
turn indirectly own parts of their own mortgage and possibly parts of other people’s
mortgages, including the corresponding guarantees. They also might own shares in the
involved investment banks that possibly still hold parts of these mortgages too. The
implications are clear: a downturn in the housing market (for whatever reason) might not
only affect the homeowner’s equity directly through the house ownership, but it might
also affect her by owning the investment banks or mortgage-backed securities involved.
This would affect the value of the mortgage, which in turn influences the value of the
investment bank (if it holds any) and the value of any mortgage-backed securities and
guarantees that are involved, etc. There is a clear risk of contagion or even a systemic
risk present in such a situation. A realistic model should try to measure these risks and
take them into account when pricing equities and liabilities.
The examples above should be sufficient to understand why modelling cross-ownership
relationships and properly taking them into account when pricing equities and liabilities
should be a major priority of mathematical finance. A generalized multi-firm structural
model that incorporates cross-ownership structures should have a profound impact not
only on the theory, but also on the practice of asset valuation. It is clear that it can be
difficult to obtain cross-ownership information and that optimally one would like to have
perfect information (lack of information, especially of price information about the under-
lying assets, is a general problem of all structural models). It is also clear that in many
cases influences other than cross-ownership might play large roles in (or even dominate)
the pricing procedure as well. However, some observers, like regulators, might have more
information than ordinary market participants, and it is clear that any properly used
cross-ownership information at all can improve a model by making it more realistic than
one where such information is ignored. In that sense, any cross-ownership information is
valuable.
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1.4 Valued added
The model of this paper is an extension of the Merton model in the sense that it has only
one maturity date and in the sense that prices at maturity are determined assuming no-
arbitrage, which includes the assumption of no-arbitrage in a potential liquidation event.
However, the main focus of the paper is not the calculation of no-arbitrage prices prior
to maturity, but the determination of no-arbitrage prices at maturity, which is trivial
in the Merton model, but not in the cross-ownership case. It will become clear that
the calculation of no-arbitrage prices before maturity is straightforward by risk-neutral
pricing (cf. Sec. 6.1) once no-arbitrage prices at maturity for any given scenario of the
underlying exogenous assets have been determined. The ways in which our model extends
the theory of asset valuation in Merton’s model are the following:
1. It models the cross-ownership of assets and liabilities for groups of firms.
2. Multiple different classes of liabilities, e.g. debt and derivatives, are allowed.
3. Multiple different priorities of claims in a possible liquidation are allowed.
4. It directly incorporates counterparty risk at the multi-firm level into derivatives
pricing.
5. Underlying exogenous assets can be stochastically dependent, a feature other exist-
ing multi-firm models have.
6. A principle of capital structure irrelevance for a system of firms in a (no-arbitrage)
price equilibrium is derived (value of externally held claims = value of exogenous
assets).
7. Situations where valuation is impossible (no no-arbitrage price equilibrium/multiple
no-arbitrage price equilibria) can exist.
8. It should be possible to extend any model based on Merton’s original idea (for
instance the Moody’s KMV model) to incorporate cross-ownership along the lines
of the model of this paper.
The main challenge in this paper is to formulate and solve the (in Merton’s single firm
model: trivial) no-arbitrage equations (cf. Sec. 4.2) that properly account for cross-
ownership in terms of the balance sheet items of all firms at maturity, under any given
possible economic scenario of the underlying exogenously priced assets. Why this is trivial
in Merton’s model but much less so in the extended model will become clear in the simple
example of Section 2. A further important insight will be that in the case of a unique
no-arbitrage price equilibrium, similarly to the Merton model, all equities and liabilities
are direct derivatives of the underlying exogenously priced assets. This makes no-arbitrage
pricing at times before maturity possible by means of risk-neutral valuation techniques.
The paper is structured as follows. After the motivating example of Section 2 and the
introduction of some notation in Section 3, Section 4 presents and interprets the main
results. These results are essentially contained in Theorem 2, which is on the existence
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and uniqueness of no-arbitrage price equilibria under the cross-ownership of equities and
general liabilities of differing seniority. Section 4 also derives results for the accounting
equations of the considered system of firms. Measures of the degree of cross-ownership
with regards to financial leverage and financial contagion are defined and discussed. After
the proof of Theorem 2 in Section 5, we consider several applications and examples in
Section 6. A conclusion and a technical appendix follow.
2 Cross-ownership: a two-firm example
To illustrate and motivate the main results of this paper, we will have a look at an example
with only two companies. Assume that company i (i = 1, 2) has outstanding nominal
debt of bi ≥ 0. There are no coupon or interest payments, and both loans have to be
paid back at the same future point in time (maturity). Company i holds assets of market
value ai ≥ 0 at maturity. We assume that these assets are exogenously priced in the sense
that the capital structure of the companies i = 1, 2 has no influence on the value of these
assets. In the original Merton model, the equity of company i at maturity, si, is now
given by
si = (ai − bi)
+ = max{0, ai − bi}. (1)
The reason for this valuation formula is that, under the bankruptcy laws of many
economies, equity in firm i essentially is a European call option on the assets of i, ai,
with a strike price of bi. Expressed in layman’s terms, the owners of i get what is left of
the company’s assets after the debt bi has been paid. However, because of limited liability,
the owners will never encounter negative equity, i.e. the owners will never have to make up
for losses of the creditors of firm i by paying them out of their own pockets after their (the
shareholders’) stake in the equity of i has become worthless. We can therefore say that si
is the liquidation value (in a perfectly liquid market with no frictions like transaction costs
or taxes) of the equity (“common stock”) of company i at maturity. The no-arbitrage
price of company i at maturity should therefore be identical to si as otherwise arbitrage
opportunities would exist. The creditors who gave company i the loan with principal bi
at outset recover at maturity the amount
ri = min{bi, ai}. (2)
From the creditors’ point of view, ri is recoverable part of the claim bi (also called recovery
claim). From company i’s point of view, ri is the payable part of the liability bi. The
reason for (2) is that the creditors can not collect more than the market value of the
company’s assets, ai, even if ai is less than the outstanding principal bi. Therefore, ri
can be interpreted as the liquidation value of the nominal debt bi at maturity, and hence
it must be identical to the price of this debt at maturity under the assumption of no
arbitrage. Actual market prices and no-arbitrage prices might converge in real markets
(even in the absence of a realistic chance of immediate liquidation) for the reason of
so-called capital-structure arbitrage where hedge funds “attempt to use these models to
buy the underpriced part of a firm’s capital structure, be it debt or equity, and sell the
overpriced part” (Robert C. Merton in Mitchell (2004)).
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As an example, if bi was 100, and at maturity ai was 150, then equity would be si = 50
and the loan recovery ri = 100, i.e. the full loan would be recovered. In contrary, was
bi = 100 as before, but at maturity ai was 50, then equity would be si = 0 since the
owners of the firm would not exercise their call option on the de-facto negative equity.
The loan recovery would therefore only be ri = ai = 50.
In the classical Merton model, the (by ai and bi) uniquely determined no-arbitrage
prices at maturity, (1) and (2), are used to obtain no-arbitrage prices for stocks and bonds
at times before maturity by modelling the price process of the assets (ai at maturity)
before maturity by a geometric Brownian motion. The Black-Scholes model (Black and
Scholes (1973), Merton (1973)) then provides a direct solution for the no-arbitrage prices
of equities and debts (Merton (1974)). The crucial non-stochastic ingredients of this
pricing approach are the no-arbitrage prices at maturity given by (1) and (2) which show
that equity and debt are mere derivatives of the underlying exogenous assets.
Expressed at the level of our example with two firms, the question this paper will
investigate is: what happens to the no-arbitrage prices of stocks and bonds at maturity,
si and ri, if company i (i = 1, 2) is allowed to own stock or bonds of company j (j = 2, 1)?
In other words, can (and if so, how) the Merton model be generalized to the case where
cross-ownership is allowed?
This is a very important question for two reasons. First and foremost, as pointed
out before, cross-ownership is present in real markets, therefore it has to be modelled
appropriately. At the time of writing this paper, we are not aware of any extension or
generalization of Merton’s corporate debt model in this direction. Second, if under cross-
ownership there were unique no-arbitrage prices at maturity as in the case of the classical
Merton model without cross-ownership, then, because of the existence of an implicit func-
tion that mapped exogenous asset prices on endogenous assets’ no-arbitrage prices, the
calculation of no-arbitrage prices at times other than maturity would be straightforward
from the completeness of the original Black-Scholes approach used in Merton (1974). The
reason for this is that as in the case of the classical Merton model, the no-arbitrage prices
of equities and debts at maturity would simply be derivatives of the underlying exogenous
assets and they could therefore be priced by the risk-neutral pricing approach using an
equivalent martingale measure. For this reason, the present paper will focus on the inves-
tigation of no-arbitrage prices at maturity, since at least from a theoretical perspective,
no-arbitrage prices before maturity are straightforward to obtain if unique price equilibria
at maturity exist and if a complete model for the price processes of the exogenous assets
is chosen.
For an illustration of the changed situation under cross-ownership again consider the
above two-firm example (bi = 100 for i = 1, 2), but with the following changes to its
set-up: assume that company i (i = 1, 2) owns 50% of the equity of company j (j = 2, 1).
We assume here that ownership in any of the two companies is an homogeneous asset
class where all owners have the same rights in proportion. Assume now that there were
no-arbitrage prices for equities and debts, si and ri (i = 1, 2). As before in the case with
no cross-ownership, we define no-arbitrage prices as no-arbitrage prices under liquidation.
If this is the case, equation (1) turns into (i = 1, 2; j = 2, 1)
si = (ai + 0.5sj − bi)
+, (3)
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since the total assets of company i (i = 1, 2) are given by the exogenous assets ai plus the
share in the equity of company j (j = 2, 1), 0.5sj. The recoverable debt at maturity, ri,
is
ri = min{bi, ai + 0.5sj}. (4)
The fundamental difference to the set-up with no cross-ownership in equations (1) and (2)
is that (3) is not a direct expression of si in terms of the exogenous assets ai and the debt
level bi. Instead, (3) is a system of two equations (i = 1, 2; j = 2, 1) for the two unkowns
s1 and s2. Having determined (if possible) s1 and s2, the recoveries ri follow immediately
from (4). The fundamental question in this example is therefore: given ai ≥ 0 and bi ≥ 0
(i = 1, 2), has system (3) a solution (s∗1, s
∗
2), and if so, is this solution unique? If both was
the case and if bi (i = 1, 2) was assumed to be fixed, then
(s∗1, s
∗
2) = (s
∗
1(a1, a2), s
∗
2(a1, a2)) (5)
would be an implicit function (in finance terms: a derivative) of the ai (i = 1, 2). If this
function was (Lebesgue-)measurable, then one would know how to price the equities and
loans at times before maturity using risk-neutral valuation for a given complete model of
the exogenous assets.
Similarly to the above case, we could consider a set-up with no equity cross-ownership,
but cross-ownership of debt instead: assume that company i (i = 1, 2) owns 50% of the
debt of company j (j = 2, 1). Again, assume that ownership of the debt of any of the
two companies is an homogeneous asset class where all owners have the same rights in
proportion. The new system for no-arbitrage equity prices would therefore be (i = 1, 2;
j = 2, 1)
si = (ai + 0.5rj − bi)
+, (6)
and the recovery of debt at maturity would be (i = 1, 2; j = 2, 1)
ri = min{bi, (ai + 0.5rj)
+}. (7)
The (·)+ in the last expression is there since debt recovery can not be negative – similar
to the equity owned by the shareholder. While this time the equity system (6) is straight-
forward, the important question is whether the loan recovery system (7) has a unique
solution (r∗1, r
∗
2).
The answer to the questions asked in both of the above examples is yes: no-arbitrage
prices exist and they are unique. This is a direct consequence of the main result of this
paper in Section 4.5. Existence and uniqueness of no-arbitrage prices also apply in much
more general set-ups than above, for instance, we can allow cross-ownership of equities
and loans (and even derivatives that have been issued on these) at any percentage level
at the same time and for any number of companies with differing debt levels. This is a
major generalization of Merton’s original model and should have direct implications for
many existing credit and derivatives pricing models in theory and practice that use the
Merton model as a basis.
To give a simple numeric example, assume for each of the three set-ups above (no cross-
ownership, 50% stock cross-ownership, 50% bond cross-ownership) that the companies 1
and 2 have exactly the same debt levels, b1 = b2, and that they own exactly the same
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type of exogenous assets, i.e. a1 = a2. The no-arbitrage prices for their equities and debts
will therefore be identical. Table 1 contains in each row for each of the three different
set-ups a value (scenario) for a1 = a2 that implies the same no-arbitrage prices under
all three set-ups. While large-scale numerical examples and more detailed examples lie
Table 1: Example for b1 = b2 = 100
no XOS 50% stock XOS 50% bond XOS no-arbitrage prices
a1 = a2 a1 = a2 a1 = a2 s1 = s2 r1 = r2
150 125 100 50 100
100 100 50 0 100
50 50 25 0 50
outside the scope of this paper, a few remarks regarding Table 1 seem apppropriate. First,
the second row clearly marks the bankruptcy level for all three set-ups. Second, in both
cases, 50% stock cross-ownership and 50% bond cross-ownership, starting with the first
row, a change of -75 (or for both firms a total of -150) in the exogenous assets, down
to the level in row three, is enough to wipe out all equity and 50% of the bond value.
This is a loss of value of 100 per firm, or 200 for both firms together. In the case of
no cross-ownership, a change of -100 (or for both firms a total of -200) is needed for the
same result. So, as should be entirely expected, starting at the same level of equity and
debt, the leverage caused by the cross-ownership structure in the market clearly creates
a higher risk regarding moves in the prices of the exogenous assets. This is a feature
classical corporate debt models or credit risk models can not properly reflect since they
are not attempting to model cross-ownership structures that are present. Mere modelling
of correlations or other dependency structures between exogenously priced assets (which
is possible within the model of this paper as well) is not sufficient to reflect the actual
interdependencies that stem from the cross-ownership of assets.
3 Notation and mathematical preliminaries
We write M > N if for two matrices M,N ∈ Rn×n with M = (Mij)i,j=1,...,n,N =
(Nij)i,j=1,...,n we have Mij ≥ Nij for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and Mij > Nij for at least one pair
(i, j). A matrix M ∈ Rn×n is called left substochastic if M is non-negative, i.e. Mij ≥ 0
for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and for any j one has
∑n
i=1Mij ≤ 1, i.e. the sums of columns are less
than or equal to 1. We will call a column j of M strictly substochastic if
∑n
i=1Mij < 1.
We will call M strictly left substochastic if all columns of M are strictly substochastic.
A right substochastic matrix is a transposed left substochastic matrix. A left substochas-
tic matrix can be interpreted as an ownership matrix (see also Ritzberger and Shorish
(2002)). The meaning and usage of an ownership matrix will be explained in Section 4.1
We will distinguish between column vectors a = (a1, . . . , an)
t ∈ Rn×1 and row vectors
at = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ R
1×n. However, for column vectors we will often conveniently write
a ∈ Rn and a = (a1, . . . , an). From the context, no confusion should arise. The meaning
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of a > b and at > bt for a,b ∈ Rn is analogue to the conventions for matrices. We use the
symbols 0 = (0, . . . , 0) (where 0 might also be used for a zero matrix), 1 = (1, . . . , 1), and
I for the identity matrix. In all cases where these symbols are used, the dimension should
be clear from the context. The following operations will apply element-wise to matrices
and vectors: the positive part, (·)+; the negative part, (·)−; the maximum, max{·, ·}; the
minimum, min{·, ·}. We will make use of the ℓ1-norm on Rn, for x ∈ Rn given by
||x||1 =
n∑
i=1
|xi|. (8)
For the ℓ1-norm of any strictly left substochastic matrix M we have (x ∈ Rn)
||M||1 = max
||x||1=1
||M · x||1 = max
j
n∑
i=1
Mij < 1, (9)
that means ||M||1 is the maximum of the column sums. As expected, it follows that
||M · x||1 ≤ ||M||1 · ||x||1, since
||M · x||1 =
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=1
Mijxj
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
n∑
j=1
|xj | ·
n∑
i=1
Mij (10)
≤
(
max
j
n∑
i=1
Mij
)
· ||x||1 = ||M||1 · ||x||1.
4 No-arbitrage pricing of general liabilities
4.1 General liabilities of differing seniority
In Section 2 we considered a situation where only stocks and bonds could be cross-owned
and where the priorities of claims in a possible liquidation were clear by default (bonds
more senior than stocks). In this section, where we consider the case with n companies
(n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}), we allow the cross-ownership of equities and more general liabilities,
including debts and derivatives. For these liabilities we allow differing priorities of the
corresponding recovery claims under liquidation.
Suppose that the vector a = (ai)i=1,...,n ≥ 0 summarily denotes the exogenous assets
of market value ai ≥ 0 held by company i (i = 1, . . . , n) at maturity. These assets
are exogenously priced in the sense that it is assumed that the capital structure of the
companies 1, . . . , n has no influence on the price of these assets. The exogenous assets a
could include physical assets like commodities or property, the work force of a company,
intellectual property, but also cash, future cash flows or claims on (equities or liabilities
of) external firms as long as these are not affected by the considered n firms’ capital
structures. We assume that the exogenous assets or parts thereof can be sold at any time
at the given price a. A sale of only a part of the assets would not affect the price of the
remaining parts. We will see in Section 6.2 that the dimension of the exogenous assets’
price vector (n above, and hence identical to the number of firms) is irrelevant to our
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considerations, and any number of exogenous assets could be considered. We choose the
dimension n for convenience only.
As mentioned earlier, a left substochastic matrix can be interpreted as an ownership
matrix. Let s ∈ Rn denote the prices of the equities of the companies 1, . . . , n. Fur-
thermore, suppose that the equities of the companies 1, . . . , n with prices s are at least
partially owned by the companies themselves. In particular, we assume that company
i owns a proportion 0 ≤ Msij ≤ 1 of the equity of company j (called the “cross-owned
fraction” in Bøhren and Michalsen (1994)). This (partial) ownership is worth Msijsj. The
ownership structure of the equities can therefore be described by the left substochastic
matrix Ms = (Msij)i,j=1,...,n (cf. Ritzberger and Shorish (2002)). The total value of any
equity that company i owns is given by the i-th entry of the vector Ms · s, i.e. by
n∑
j=1
Msijsj. (11)
Similarly, we can describe the cross-ownership structure of any outstanding liabilities by
means of a left substochastic matrix.
In order to properly reflect cross-ownership structures that are present in a group of
firms, any firm that owns equities or liabilities of firms in this group, where at the same
time the group owns part of the equity or liabilities of the considered firm, should be
included in the model. Firms which only own equities or liabilities of other firms, but
who’s own equity or liabilities are not at least partially owned by other firms, do not have
to be considered since they are price takers in this market in the sense that their own
assets and liabilies do not influence other firms’ balance sheets.
ASSUMPTION 1. Let Ms and Md,i (i = 1, . . . , m) be strictly left substochastic matri-
ces. Let a ∈ (R+0 )
n. For i = 1, . . . , m, let di be a function
Rn(m+1) −→ (R+0 )
n (12)

r1
...
rm
s

 7−→ dir1,...,rm,s. (13)
Suppose now that the n elements of the vector di define the liabilities of the n consid-
ered firms, where i = 1, . . . , m are the priorities of the corresponding claims in a possible
liquidation of any firm (e.g. by Chapter 7), such that 1 is the highest priority (paid first)
and m is the lowest (paid last). We assume that these liabilities are payable in cash. The
functions di are non-negative since negative liabilities are assets (another firm’s liability)
and hence they will be modelled as such. Suppose that the ri ∈ Rn are the vectors of
recovery claims belonging to di. So, while the di describe what is supposed to be paid at
maturity, the ri stand for the actual payoff, which could be after a liquidation due to the
default of the writer of the liability. In general, we should therefore have
0 ≤ ri ≤ di. (14)
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For simplicity, we assume that there is only one liability per firm per level of seniority.
However, as long as it was clear how to split the corresponding recovery claim in any
economic scenario of a liquidation situation in which the claim would be recovered at less
than par, it would be no problem to assume that any of these liabilities was a sum of
several liabilities of the same seniority. If such an agreement (of a split) did not exist, one
could possibly assume a repayment pari passu.
A very simple version of a liabilities function di would be where di
r
1,...,rm,s
≡ bi ∈
(R+0 )
n. In this case, the liabilities would be simple loans, rather than general liabilities,
like derivatives that could depend on other assets like s. However, since di
r
1,...,rm,s
has
the ri as arguments, the liability functions can even depend on their own(!) eventual
payoff (see an example in Sec. 6.4). Assumption 1 is also very general in the sense that
no restrictions on derivatives regarding exogenous assets have been made. This is because
exogenous assets are treated as constants in our framework since all considerations are
conditional on given prices for exogenous assets. So, to be very clear about this and
although we will not use this notation later, the di may also depend on the exogenously
priced assets a, i.e. one generally has
di
r
1,...,rm,s = d
i
r
1,...,rm,s,a. (15)
For an example see Section 6.3.
Regarding the issue of strictly substochastic matrices in Assumption 1 (rather than
just substochastic ones), an example in Sec. 6.5 will illustrate the kind of problems that
can arise if ownership matrices are not strictly substochastic. A more thorough discussion
of the possible effects of non-strictly substochastic matrices is beyond the scope of this
paper.
4.2 The liquidation value equations
Suppose now that the matrices Ms and Md,i (i = 1, . . . , m) are ownership matrices as
in Section 4.1. Assume that Ms describes the equity (common stock) cross-ownership
in the system of n firms, while the Md,i (i = 1, . . . , m) describe the cross-ownership of
general liabilities, with Md,i belonging to di. Under this set-up and under Assumption 1,
we demand the following at maturity:
ASSUMPTION 2 (Absolute Priority Rule). The priority of claims is honored. Equity
is the residual claim.
The Absolute Priority Rule, which requests strict adherence to the seniority of lia-
bilities in a liquidation in the sense that any higher rank claim has to be fully paid off
before any lower rank claim can be paid, is not always honored in real life. Longhofer and
Carlstrom (1995) write:
While this rule would seem quite simple to implement, it is routinely circum-
vented in practice. In fact, bankruptcy courts themselves play a major role in
abrogating this feature of debt contracts.
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However, the circumstances (liquidation vs. reorganization, or political intervention) and
also the extent to which the rule is disregarded vary (see e.g. Eberhart, Moore and Roen-
feldt (1990)) and can not be discussed in this paper. For the purpose of our theory,
Assumption 2 is reasonably close to practice.
Under Assumption 2, the equations
r1 = min
{
d1
r
1,...,rm,s, a+M
s · s+
m∑
i=1
Md,i · ri
}
(16)
For 0 < j < m:
rj+1 = min

dj+1r1,...,rm,s,
(
a+Ms · s+
m∑
i=1
Md,i · ri −
j∑
i=1
di
r
1,...,rm,s
)+
 (17)
s =
(
a+Ms · s +
m∑
i=1
Md,i · ri −
m∑
i=1
di
r
1,...,rm,s
)+
(18)
follow for the liquidation values of r1, . . . , rm and s. Liquidation means here that at
maturity all assets are converted into cash and subsequently all equity is paid out in cash as
well. Because of Assumption 2, each claim on a liability will only pay the minimum of the
promised payoff and the value of the remaining assets of the firm after liabilities of higher
seniority have been paid. In this sense, the equations (16) – (18) are the generalization
of the Merton equations (1) and (2) for the multi-firm case with general liabilities under
cross-ownership. However, while in Merton’s case the liquidation of equity is trivial since
any equity is identical to the remaining exogenous assets after paying the debt, it is
much less obvious how such a liquidation would work in our case due to the equity
entanglement caused by cross-ownership. For a further and more thorough discussion of
the issue of liquidation see therefore Section 4.6. In that section we will also show under
fairly reasonable assumptions that the equations (16) – (18) must hold for the no-arbitrage
prices of equities and liabilities at maturity. Hence, no-arbitrage prices and liquidation
values are identical.
Note that r1 are the recovery claims with the highest priority in a liquidation, and
rm are the recoveries of the lowest priority claims. Equity s is, of course, the first asset
to be wiped out, then, in this order, the recoveries rm to r1 get wiped out (component-
wise). The model is flexible enough to not only incorporate bonds and derivatives of
differing seniority, but also some derivatives could rank higher than some bonds. We call
a non-negative solution (r1∗, . . . , rm∗, s∗) of the system (16) – (18) a no-arbitrage price
equilibrium. In Assumption 2 we defined equity as the “residual claim”. In practice, the
asset class closest to this would be “common stock”. The asset class of “preferred stock”,
which usually has more rights and a higher seniority in a default event, would in our
set-up be modelled as one of the liabilities ranking higher than equity.
In a first attempt, one would possibly formulate the liquidation value equations (16)
– (18) such that the first one would read
r1 = min
{
d1
r
1,...,rm,s,
(
a+Ms · s+
m∑
i=1
Md,i · ri
)+}
, (19)
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which is in line with the fact that also the highest priority recipient of liquidation proceeds
can never be forced to pay (rather than receive) during the liquidation process. The
lemma below shows that the system (16) – (18) is equivalent to the possibly more natural
approach given by the system (19), (17) and (18). We will prefer to work with (16) – (18)
since it is somewhat leaner and simplifies some of our proofs.
LEMMA 1. Under Assumption 1, any solution (r1∗, . . . , rm∗, s∗) of the system (16) –
(18) is non-negative. Hence, (16) – (18) and (19), (17) and (18) have identical solutions.
For the proof of the lemma we will use the following notation. Let π be a per-
mutation (i.e. a bijection) on {1, . . . , n} and a ∈ Rn and M ∈ Rn×n. We denote
pia = (api(1), . . . , api(n)), and we denote pipiM for the matrix obtained fromM by permuting
elements such that pipiMij = Mpi(i)pi(j) for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The latter is a simultaneous
permutation of rows and columns.
Proof. Let (r1∗, . . . , rm∗, s∗) be a solution of (16) – (18). Hence, r2∗, . . . , rm∗, s∗ ∈ (R+0 )
n.
Consider now Eq. (16), and substitute with a solution (r1∗, . . . , rm∗, s∗) which contains at
least one r1∗i < 0 (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}). By the help of a permutation π on {1, . . . , n}, we can
now re-arrange rows and columns of this new system such that it has the equivalent form
pir
1∗ = min
{
pi(d
1
r
1∗,...,rm∗,s∗), pia+ pipiM
s · pis
∗ +
m∑
i=1
pipiM
d,i · pir
i∗
}
, (20)
where rows 1 to j (j ∈ {1, . . . , n}) are non-negative, and rows j + 1 to n are negative.
The matrices pipiM
s and pipiM
d,i are again strictly left substochastic matrices since sums
of columns are still less than 1. Consider now the subsystem that consists of the negative
rows from j + 1 to n. Row k (j + 1 ≤ k ≤ n) has the form
pir
1∗
k = piak +
n∑
l=1
pipiM
s
kl · pis
∗
l +
m∑
i=1
n∑
l=1
pipiM
d,i
kl · pir
i∗
l . (21)
However, since pir
2∗, . . . , pir
m∗, pis
∗ ∈ (R+0 )
n and pir
1∗
l ≥ 0 for 1 ≤ l ≤ j, we can write
pir
1∗
k = ck +
n∑
l=j+1
pipiM
d,1
kl · pir
1∗
l (22)
for some ck ≥ 0. Define now
r′ = (pir
1∗
j+1, . . . , pir
1∗
n )
t, (23)
c = (cj+1, . . . , cn)
t, (24)
M′ = (pipiM
d,1
kl )k,l=j+1,...,n. (25)
The system (22) (for j + 1 ≤ k ≤ n) can now be written as
r′ = c+M′ · r′, (26)
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where r′ < 0 and c ≥ 0. Since the matrixM′ as the lower right (n−j)×(n−j)-submatrix
of pipiM
d,1 is again a strictly left substochastic matrix, we can apply Lemma 3 of Section
A.1 to the system
r′ = (I−M′)−1 · c, (27)
which is equivalent to (26). Since (I −M′)−1 is non-negative according to Lemma 3,
Eq. (27) is a contradiction.
4.3 Accounting equations
Before we turn to results about the existence of no-arbitrage price equilibria in Section
4.5, it is useful to first consider the balance sheet equations under no-arbitrage, as well as
measures of leverage and cross-ownership (in Sec. 4.4).
Under no-arbitrage, the accounting equations (or balance sheet equations),
a+Ms · s +
m∑
i=1
Md,i · ri = s+
m∑
i=1
ri (28)
assets + receivables = equity + payable liabilities,
follow directly from applying Eq. (84) in Lemma 4 in Section A.3 to the right side of the
sum of the system (16) – (18). Under no-arbitrage, Eq. (28) holds componentwise (per
firm) with all components being non-negative. It therefore also holds in absolute terms
(ℓ1-terms) for the total capital in the considered system:
||a||1 + ||M
s · s||1 +
m∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣Md,i · ri∣∣∣∣
1
= ||s||1 +
m∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣ri∣∣∣∣
1
(29)
total assets + total receivables = total equity + total payable liabilities.
The right side of (29) represents all claims on equity and liabilities of the financial firms
1, . . . , n. The left side, apart from ||a||1, represents all claims on equity and liabilities
that are claimed within the system of the firms 1, . . . , n itself. Expressed differently, the
following mathematically trivial (from (29)) but from an economic perspective certainly
important equation,
||s||1 +
m∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣ri∣∣∣∣
1︸ ︷︷ ︸ −

||Ms · s||1 + m∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣Md,i · ri∣∣∣∣
1︸ ︷︷ ︸

 = ||a||1 (30)
all claims − internally held claims = exogenous assets,
means that under no-arbitrage the sum of the values of all externally held claims regarding
the financial firms 1, . . . , n is identical to the value of all exogenous assets owned by these
firms. It is remarkable that ownership structures and the amount of financial leverage
therefore have no influence on the aggregate value of externally held assets regarding these
companies. In other terms, all asset value that stems from internal leverage (internal
leverage will be properly defined in Eq. (32) below) is contained within the system and
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hence somewhat irrelevant to outsiders who hold claims of this system but who are not
themselves partially owned or financially liable to this system. Although being relevant
for a system of firms only, and not for individual firms, this seems to be an interesting
principle of capital structure irrelevance. We therefore state it as a separate theorem.
THEOREM 1. Under the Assumptions 1 and 2, the no-arbitrage value of all externally
held claims (liabilities and equity) belonging to a group of firms is identical to the no-
arbitrage value of the exogenous assets owned by the group:
value of externally held claims = value of exogenous assets. (31)
The aggregate value of the externally held claims is therefore independent of any other
aspects of the financial structure of this group.
4.4 Measures of leverage and cross-ownership
From Eq. (30) in the previous section it is fairly obvious that a high degree of cross-
ownership within a group of financial firms (i.e. when the matrices M· have large entries;
for instance, all column sums could be close to 1) leads to artificially large balance sheets
when compared with the underlying exogenous asset base. In this section we therefore
look at measures of financial leverage and cross-ownership under no-arbitrage.
It is clear that the standard measure of financial leverage in the case of a single firm,
the debt-to-equity ratio (it should be liabilities-to-equity anyway), is not very useful if
we consider a whole group of firms and if we want to assess the degree of their (internal)
leverage as a group. In fact, Eq. (30) shows that even in the case of no liabilities at all, the
cross-ownership of equity alone could cause balances to be a large multiple of the value
of the underlying exogenous assets. We therefore need to find a meaningful measure of
the internal leverage for a group of financial firms. Assume now ||a||1 > 0, and define
L =
||Ms · s||1 +
∑m
i=1
∣∣∣∣Md,i · ri∣∣∣∣
1
||a||1
, (32)
=
internally held claims
exogenous assets
(31)
=
internally held claims
externally held claims
. (33)
This value can be interpreted as the level of internal financial leverage in the considered
system. Note that L = L(a) since not only ||a||1, but also s and the r
i depend on a.
Furthermore, by (29),
L+ 1 =
||s||1 +
∑m
i=1 ||r
i||1
||a||1
, (34)
=
total claims
externally held claims
=
total assets
exogenous assets
. (35)
Related to (32) is for ||s||1 +
∑m
i=1 ||r
i||1 > 0 the value defined by (cf. (30))
I =
||Ms · s||1 +
∑m
i=1
∣∣∣∣Md,i · ri∣∣∣∣
1
||s||1 +
∑m
i=1 ||r
i||1
=
L
L+ 1
, (36)
=
internally held claims
total claims
, (37)
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which could be seen as a measure of the degree of financial cross-ownership. We could
also consider this to be a measure of financial inbreeding or self-excitement. Because of
||Ms||1, ||M
d,i||1 ∈ [0, 1) for i = 1, . . . , m (cf. Eq. (9)), it follows from (10) that for
Imax = max{||Ms||1, ||M
d,1||1, . . . , ||M
d,m||1} (38)
one has
0 ≤ I ≤ Imax < 1. (39)
Since L = I
1−I
and since L is a strictly monotonically increasing function of I, it follows
immediately that for
Lmax =
Imax
1− Imax
(40)
one has
0 ≤ L ≤ Lmax < +∞ (41)
and
||s||1 +
m∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣ri∣∣∣∣
1
(34)
= (L+ 1)||a||1 ≤ (L
max + 1)||a||1. (42)
The upper boundary Lmax is sharp, as an example in Section 6.6 demonstrates. Another
straightforward conclusion from the Equations (39) and (29) is that ||a||1 = 0 is equivalent
to ||s||1 = ||r
1||1 = . . . = ||r
m||1 = 0.
The value L + 1 is the value of the sum of the balance sheets of all firms expressed
in terms of the sum of all exogenous assets (cf. Eq. (35)). It seems therefore plausible
that the higher L, or, equivalently, the lower the percentage of exogenous assets in the
balance sheets, the higher the risk for the balance sheets that stems from these exogenous
assets in absolute terms. Such risk could for instance materialize in the form of an
instantaneous shock in the prices of the exogenous assets just before (at) maturity. The
values L and I could therefore also be seen as measures of systemic risk or financial
contagion in the absence of liquidity risk (see also Section 4.6). As we pointed out earlier,
L = L(a) and I = I(a) (see also the example in Table 2). Therefore, the considered
measures are calculated for one particular scenario for the exogenous assets. For a physical
probability measure, P, or for an equivalent martingale measure, Q, for instance taken
from a stochastic model for a (cf. Sec. 6.1), one method to obtain such measures for all
scenarios at the same time could be to calculate the expectations
EP[L], EQ[L] ≤ L
max, or EP[I], EQ[I], ≤ I
max. (43)
It is clear that no-arbitrage prices before maturity, obtained for instance by risk-neutral
pricing (cf. Sec. 6.1), would already reflect any risk from systemic cross-ownership and
leverage. See Sec. 6.1 also for a further idea how measures of cross-ownership could be
obtained at times before maturity.
In summary it can be said that under no-arbitrage cross-ownership does not overstate
equity – the equity is there, according to no-arbitrage prices. However, cross-ownership can
somewhat artificially inflate balance sheets (and potentially share prices) in comparison
to the underlying exogenous assets. Cross-ownership should therefore be an integral part
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of any measure of market leverage. For instance, Table 2 shows the values of L for the
example in Section 2 (Table 1). The first row of values demonstrates from left to right how
decreasing exogenous assets prices but increasing leverage lead to the same no-arbitrage
prices of equities and liabilities, i.e. the total assets on the balance sheets in the system
are identical in all three cases. In Section 1.1, we quoted Ritzberger and Shorish (2002)
Table 2: Example of Sec. 2 for b1 = b2 = 100
no XOS 50% stock XOS 50% bond XOS no-arbitrage prices
a1 = a2 L a1 = a2 L a1 = a2 L s1 = s2 r1 = r2
150 0 125 0.2 100 0.5 50 100
100 0 100 0 50 1 0 100
50 0 50 0 25 1 0 50
with the statement “that under cross-ownership the book value of a firm will tend to
be overestimated with respect to the underlying cash flows.” This would be exactly the
case here if we considered discounted cashflows for the exogenous assets. In that sense,
cross-ownership can cause leverage that not only increases the risk of contagion, but there
also exists a moral issue as far as some investors might not be aware of the kind of hidden
leverage cross-ownership of equity can cause. However, as we have seen in Theorem 1,
external owners of claims and equities are in aggregate not affected by cross-ownership
leverage.
In contrast to our measure of internal leverage, for ||s||1 > 0, a measure for the external
financial leverage in the system could be defined as the ratio of payable externally held
liabilities to externally held equity (cf. debt-to-equity),
Lex =
∑m
i=1 ||r
i||1 −
∑m
i=1
∣∣∣∣Md,i · ri∣∣∣∣
1
||s||1 − ||M
s · s||1
(44)
=
externally held liabilities
externally held equity
. (45)
However, in the light of Theorem 1, for external claimholders, external leverage is essen-
tially as irrelevant as internal one since there is no influence on the value of all externally
held assets, which is constant ||a||1.
While we are not considering measures for the leverage of individual companies here,
they certainly serve an important purpose. However, on a market-wide scope, internal
leverage as defined in (32) is possibly the most relevant measure of leverage, even though
it matters only within a group of firms, and not outside.
4.5 Existence and uniqueness results
ASSUMPTION 3. The functions di of Assumption 1 are continuous for i = 1, . . . , m.
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ASSUMPTION 4. For i = 1, . . . , m and j = 1, . . . , n,
di
r
1,...,rm,s =
(
ψij
(∑n
k=1M
s
jksk +
∑m
l=1
∑n
k=1M
d,l
jk r
l
k
) )
j=1,...,n
(46)
where ψij : R→ R
+
0 are monotonically increasing functions such that for any y
1,y2 ∈ Rn
with y1 ≥ y2
y1 − y2 ≥
m∑
i=1
(
ψij(y
1
j )− ψ
i
j(y
2
j )
)
j=1,...,n
. (47)
Assumption 4 is obviously much stronger than Assumption 3. Condition (47) alone
is a stronger condition than Lipschitz continuity. Note that while Assumption 4 restricts
allowed liabilities (derivatives) in the sense that they can only be written honoring re-
striction (46) with regards to the sum of the endogenous assets owned by the underwriter
itself, the assumption is still liberal in the sense that no restrictions on derivatives regard-
ing exogenous assets have been made (see also Eq. (15) and the remarks there). In that
sense, we could as well write ψij = aψ
i
j in Assumption 4. For example, liabilities, where
di
r
1,...,rm,s,a
≡ bi(a) ∈ (R+0 )
n, fulfill Assumption 4 (see also Sec. 6.3 for an example).
The following theorem is this paper’s main result on the existence and uniqueness of
no-arbitrage prices in the presence of cross-ownership of equities and general liabilities of
differing seniority.
THEOREM 2. Under Assumption 1, the following hold:
1. The system (16) – (18) can only have non-negative solutions.
2. For any solution of (16) – (18), the size of the sum of all balance sheets is less than
or equal to (Lmax + 1)||a||1, where L
max is as in (40).
3. Under the additional Assumption 3, the system (16) – (18) has at least one solution.
4. Under the additional Assumption 4, the solution of (16) – (18) is unique, i.e. all
endogenous assets are derivatives of the exogenous assets. The implicit function
Ψ : a −→


r1∗(a)
...
rm∗(a)
s∗(a)

 (48)
(the ‘derivative’) that maps the exogenous assets a on the solution of (16) – (18) is
Lebesgue-measurable.
The first part of Theorem 2 is Lemma 1. The second part follows directly from
Eq. (42). Proofs for the other parts and an algorithm for the solution in part four can be
found in Section 5. The fourth part means that under Assumption 4, similarly as in the
original Merton model, all (recovery) claims on equities and liabilities are derivatives of the
underlying exogenously priced assets. The payout of a derivative is, as always, understood
to be a function of the underlying asset(s), i.e. the payout is uniquely determined by the
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value of the underlying. The existence of a unique solution for the system (16) – (18)
therefore implies the function (48). For instance, if a was replaced by a vector of random
variables (i.e. a stochastic model for the endogenously priced assets), then this derivative
would be a random variable too due to Lebesgue-measurability. Obviously, it is here
assumed that the ownership matrices Ms and Md,1, . . . ,Md,m and other features of (16)
– (18) are fixed – as they would be in a real life situation. Since Ψ is a Lebesgue-
measurable derivative of a that uniquely determines the no-arbitrage prices of equity
and recovery claims in terms of the exogenous assets, this means that, as in the original
Merton valuation model for one firm, the theory of risk-neutral pricing can be applied
for the valuation of equities and liabilities in the multi-firm case with cross-ownership.
In particular, this means that no-arbitrage prices before maturity can be determined (see
Sec. 6.1).
Clearly, Assumption 4 is a restriction that one would want to weaken as much as
possible. However, for uniqueness, Assumption 3 alone is not enough, as an example with
more than one no-arbitrage equilibrium in Section 6.4 will show (see also Sec. 4.7).
4.6 A comment on liquidation and no-arbitrage
Equation (28) implies that
a+
m∑
i=1
Md,i · ri −
m∑
i=1
ri = s−Ms · s. (49)
Netting or paying all recovery claims (payable liabilities) at maturity is no problem if
Ms = 0, even if some (or all) firms are in default. The reason is that in this case the
right side of (49) is non-negative, which means that the left side implies that, for any of
the n companies, exogenous assets plus receivable recovery claims are sufficient to pay the
recovery claims on all liabilities they have written. Hence, no sale or liquidation of equity
is needed to pay for the cash liabilities.
If for any company the corresponding row of (49) was identical zero, then exogenous
assets and receivables would exactly cover the payable liabilities – a sign that the firm’s
equity was zero and that it might be in default.
Problems arise if some components of the right side of (49) are negative, since in
this case selling the exogenous assets (which can be treated like cash for this purpose)
and receiving cash claims will not be enough to pay the recovery claims belonging to the
liabilities of these firms. This means that assets in the form of equity, i.e. components of
Ms · s, have to be liquidated in order to pay for liabilities. This is only possible if there
either is a buyer (inside or outside the group of firms) willing to buy at the determined
no-arbitrage prices, or if equity owners (shareholders) are able to cash in on equity by
liquidating their share of the firm’s assets. In Section 4.2 this problem was avoided by
considering directly liquidation values, i.e. implicitly it was assumed that all n firms got
liquidated at maturity. Such a liquidation could happen as follows. A bank, e.g. a central
bank, lends each firm an amount of the size of the firm’s balance sheet according to no-
arbitrage prices. Each company then pays out liabilities and equity as summarized by the
right side of the balance sheet (28). Hence, each company receives equities and claims as
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listed on the left side of the balance sheet, and it can also sell the exogenous assets. Each
bank loan is then paid back using the proceeds (left side equals right side). It is assumed
that this happens instantaneously and no interest is paid on the bank loans. The result
in the end is that all values in liabilites and equities as determined by the liquidation
value equations (16) – (18) have been paid off. Note that in this case of a bank-buffered
liquidation there is no need to sell any assets other than the exogenous ones outside the
group of considered firms.
We now turn to an alternative approach of justifying the liquidation value equations
(16) – (18) as equations for prices under no-arbitrage by a no-arbitrage argument in which
a complete liquidation is not necessarily required. However, at least the threat of (partial)
liquidation is necessary to make the argument work.
ASSUMPTION 5. As long as there are outstanding liabilities of a firm i (i = 1, . . . , m),
any remaining assets of firm i have to be liquidated in order to pay these.
ASSUMPTION 6. Because Ms and Md,i (i = 1, . . . , m) are strictly left substochastic
matrices, we assume that there is a market outside the group of n firms that instanta-
neously trades fractions of the liabilities and equities that are not owned within the group
of n firms at maturity. In this market, any amount of liabilities or equities of the group
of n firms, or perfect replications thereof, can be sold at prevailing prices. Assume that
this market also trades the exogenous assets and that shortselling is allowed. Any amount
of cash can be borrowed instantaneously at no interest. Further, assume that this market
is free of (instantaneous) arbitrage.
ASSUMPTION 7. Any participant in the market of Assumption 6 who owns equity of
any of the n firms is allowed to liquidate her part of the equity.
ASSUMPTION 8. The group of n firms participates in the market of Assumption 6
and sells any amount of equity at prevailing prices if asked to do so. Furthermore, any
participant in the market who owns the entire equity of any of the n firms can liquidate
this firm.
We now check that the Assumptions 2, 5, 6, and 7 (first set of assumptions), alterna-
tively the Assumptions 2, 5, 6, and 8 (second set of assumptions), lead to the equations
(16) – (18) for the no-arbitrage prices of equities and liabilities in the market of Assump-
tion 6.
Under both sets of assumptions, the right hand sides of the no-arbitrage equations
(16) – (18) correctly describe the payoffs of any liabilities, respectively the liquidation
value of any equity. Therefore, no-arbitrage prices of any recovery claims, which are paid
in cash, have to equal the amounts paid. Hence, equations (16) and (17) apply to these
prices. For equities, the case where equity costs less than the liquidation value directly
leads to arbitrage by liquidation due to Assumption 7 or Assumption 8. However, in the
case of Assumption 8, the market agent would have to borrow enough cash to buy all
the equity of the corresponding firm, while under Assumption 7 any fractional amount
would suffice. If equity is overvalued compared to the liquidation value (right hand side of
Eq. (18) for the row corresponding to that firm), then a participant can (proportionally)
replicate the right hand side of Eq. (18) and sell this product in the market at higher
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than purchasing price, creating instant arbitrage. For this argument we have to assume
that market participants are rational in the sense that they do not discriminate between
actual equity and perfectly replicated equity (cf. Assumption 6).
In summary, it seems appropriate to say that the equations (16) – (18) describe the
prices of equities and liabilities under the assumption of no instantaneous arbitrage given
the possibility of (partial) liquidation. The no-arbitrage arguments that were used obvi-
ously relate to Merton’s comment on capital-structure arbitrage in Mitchell (2004) (cf. Sec-
tion 2).
It is clear that a violation of either the no-arbitrage equations (16) – (18), or the bal-
ance sheet equations (28) would mean either the violation of contractual law (the priority
of claims), or the manipulation of balance sheets against better knowledge, for instance by
ignoring current market prices of the assets on that balance sheet, creating an opportunity
of instantaneous arbitrage. In this sense, a no-arbitrage equilibrium determined by (16)
– (18) is indisputable from a theoretical point of view. However, a main ingredient of our
argument is the possibility of a liquidation, potentially a liquidation of all firms involved.
This is of course also true for the original Merton approach, but seems less rigorous there
since only one firm with a very simple capital structure is affected. Nonetheless, we would
argue that any pricing approach conflicting with the one outlined in this paper could lead
to significant problems at some stage since inconsistent pricing at one instance could lead
to even bigger inconsistencies over longer periods of time.
4.7 A comment on uniqueness
We will see in Section 6.4 that there are examples when Assumption 3 holds but no unique
price equilibrium exists. In such cases, endogenous asset values are no derivatives of the
underlying exogenous assets in the sense of an implicit function Ψ as in (48), since the
considered relation is not uniquely determined on the right hand side. In such situations,
the market can not price the assets in an indisputable and rational manner. Prices at
maturity but also before maturity are indeterminable. This is a very unhealthy market
situation because of the uncertainty it creates. It is our opinion that financial contracts
or derivatives that cause such situations should be illegal. In this sense, this theory could
be useful to regulators in order to outrule such or similar situations and in order to assess
these kind of situations before they become a real world problem.
Note that this problem is different from the problem of the incompleteness of a market.
In the case of incompleteness, payoffs, that can not be replicated, can have a range of
prices within which no arbitrage can occur, i.e. the no-arbitrage price is not unique, and
usually the choice of one equivalent martingale measure (EMM) out of a range of possible
EMMs leads to one specific no-arbitrage price system. In the case of the example above,
even the choice of one specific EMM is of no use since there exists no uniquely determined
expectation of the discounted payoffs, because the payoffs themselves are not uniquely
determined given any state of the world. However, the situation is comparable with
incompleteness to some extent since, in the case of non-unique no-arbitrage prices, the
counterparties could agree on one specific no-arbitrage price set for each possible scenario
of the exogenous assets, similar to the choice of one equivalent martingale measure in the
incomplete market case. It is clear that the task of determining the set of all priceable
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or allowed liabilities (derivatives) in a given system is equivalent to the question of the
weakest conditions for the liabilities functions di that still allow for a unique solution of
the no-arbitrage equations (16) – (18).
5 Proof and algorithm
5.1 Third part of Theorem 2
Important ingredients for the proof of the third part of Theorem 2 are the Brouwer–
Schauder Fixed Point Theorem (Theorem 3 in Section A.2) and Lemma 4 of Section
A.3.
Proof. Any solution of the system (16) – (18) is a fixed point of the mapping Φ :

r1
r2
...
rm
s

 7−→


min{d1
r
1,...,rm,s
, a+Ms · s +
∑m
i=1M
d,i · ri}
min{d2
r
1,...,rm,s
, (a+Ms · s+
∑m
i=1M
d,i · ri − d1
r
1,...,rm,s
)+}
...
min{dm
r
1,...,rm,s
, (a+Ms · s+
∑m
i=1M
d,i · ri −
∑m−1
i=1 d
i
r
1,...,rm,s
)+}
(a+Ms · s+
∑m
i=1M
d,i · ri −
∑m
i=1 d
i
r
1,...,rm,s
)+


(50)
and vice versa. Because of Lemma 1, we only need to consider Φ on (R+0 )
n(m+1). Because of
Eq. (84) in Lemma 4 (cf. Section 4.3), one has with Imax as in (38) and for r1, r2, . . . , rm, s ∈
(R+0 )
n that ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Φ


r1
...
rm
s


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣a+Ms · s +
m∑
i=1
Md,i · ri
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
1
(51)
= ||a||1 + ||M
s · s||1 +
m∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣Md,i · ri∣∣∣∣
1
(10)
≤ ||a||1 + ||M
s||1 · ||s||1 +
m∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣Md,i∣∣∣∣
1
·
∣∣∣∣ri∣∣∣∣
1
≤ ||a||1 + I
max ·
(
||s||1 +
m∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣ri∣∣∣∣
1
)
= ||a||1 + I
max ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣


r1
...
rm
s


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
.
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From (51), and since Lmax + 1 = 1
1+Imax
, we furthermore obtain that if
0 ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣


r1
...
rm
s


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
≤ (Lmax + 1)||a||1 (52)
then
0 ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Φ


r1
...
rm
s


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
≤ (Lmax + 1)||a||1. (53)
Under Assumption 3, Φ (cf. (50)) is continuous and (52) and (53) mean that we can apply
the Brouwer–Schauder Fixed Point Theorem by considering Φ on the compact subset of
(R+0 )
n(m+1) defined by (52). The system (16) – (18) has therefore at least one non-negative
solution with a balance sheet size of less than or equal to (Lmax + 1)||a||1.
5.2 Fourth part of Theorem 2 and algorithm
The main ingredients for the proof of the fourth part of Theorem 2 are Banach’s Con-
traction Mapping Theorem, Lemma 2 below, and Lemma 5 of Section A.3. Readers who
are less familiar with the Contraction Mapping Theorem and the notion of a contraction
in general might want to have a look at Section A.2 (Definition 1 and Theorem 4) before
reading on.
LEMMA 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 4, the mapping Φ in (50) is a strict contraction
on Rn(m+1) under the metric implied by the ℓ1-norm on Rn(m+1).
Proof. Let r1,1, . . . , rm,1, s1, r1,2, . . . , rm,2, s2 ∈ Rn. Define g ∈ Rn(m+1) as
g = Φ


r1,1
...
rm,1
s1

 − Φ


r1,2
...
rm,2
s2

 , (54)
and h ∈ Rn as
h = Ms · s1 +
m∑
i=1
Md,i · ri,1 −
(
Ms · s2 +
m∑
i=1
Md,i · ri,2
)
(55)
= Ms · (s1 − s2) +
m∑
i=1
Md,i · (ri,1 − ri,2).
For k ∈ {1 . . . , n}, define x = ak, and for l = 1, 2 define
yl =
n∑
j=1
Mskjs
l
j +
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
M
d,i
kj r
i,l
j . (56)
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This means that hk = y
1 − y2 and that
gk = min
{
ψ1k(y
1), x+ y1
}
−min
{
ψ1k(y
2), x+ y2
}
(57)
For 0 < j < m:
gk+nj = min

ψj+1k (y1),
(
x+ y1 −
j∑
i=1
ψik(y
1)
)+
 (58)
−min

ψj+1k (y2),
(
x+ y2 −
j∑
i=1
ψik(y
2)
)+

gk+nm =
(
x+ y1 −
m∑
i=1
ψik(y
1)
)+
−
(
x+ y2 −
m∑
i=1
ψik(y
2)
)+
(59)
Lemma 5 in Section A.3, in conjunction with Assumption 4, now implies that
m∑
j=0
|gk+nj| = |hk|. (60)
Therefore ||g||1 = ||h||1. With I
max as in (38) and (39),
||g||1 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Φ


r1,1
...
rm,1
s1

 − Φ


r1,2
...
rm,2
s2


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
= ||h||1 (61)
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣Ms · (s1 − s2) +
m∑
i=1
Md,i · (ri,1 − ri,2)
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
1
≤
∣∣∣∣Ms · (s1 − s2)∣∣∣∣
1
+
m∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣Md,i · (ri,1 − ri,2)∣∣∣∣
1
≤ ||Ms||1 ·
∣∣∣∣(s1 − s2)∣∣∣∣
1
+
m∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣Md,i∣∣∣∣
1
·
∣∣∣∣(ri,1 − ri,2)∣∣∣∣
1
≤ Imax ·
(∣∣∣∣(s1 − s2)∣∣∣∣
1
+
m∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣(ri,1 − ri,2)∣∣∣∣
1
)
= Imax ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣


r1,1
...
rm,1
s1

 −


r1,2
...
rm,2
s2


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
.
Proof and algorithm
Proof. Given Lemma 2, Banach’s Contraction Mapping Theorem (Section A.2, Theorem
4) immediately implies that the system (16) – (18) has a unique solution. To obtain
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the unique solution of system (16) – (18) under Assumption 4, the recursion (83) of the
Contraction Mapping Theorem (also sometimes called Picard iteration) can be used with
Φ as in (50). To better account for the dependency of (50) on a, we denote (50) now by
Φa. Hence,
Ψ(a) ≡ lim
m→∞
Φm
a
(·) = lim
m→∞
Φa ◦ . . . ◦ Φa︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
(·). (62)
Regarding the proof of Lebesgue-measurability, it is straightforward to show that the
function Φ·(·) is a continuous map R
n×Rn(m+1) → Rn(m+1). Similarly, it is straigtforward
that the function (note the somewhat sloppy notation) Φm· (·) : R
n × Rn(m+1) → Rn(m+1)
(m = 1, 2, . . .), which is obtained from
Φm
a
(·) = Φa ◦ · · · ◦ Φa︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
(·) (63)
by replacing a by ·, is continuous too. Continuity implies Lebesgue-measurability. How-
ever, we know that Φm
a
(·) has the non-functional limit (62), hence limm→∞ Φ
m
· (·) = Ψ·. A
point-wise limit of measurable functions is measurable, therefore Ψ· = Ψ·(·) is Lebesgue-
measurable on Rn × Rn(m+1), with the second argument being irrelevant. It follows now
from basic measure theory that Ψ· is Lebesgue-measurable on R
n.
6 Applications and examples
6.1 No-arbitrage prices before maturity
So far, only the existence of no-arbitrage prices at maturity has been considered. Assume
now that the exogenous assets are given by an n-dimensional price process a(t) where
t ∈ T, with minT = 0 being the present time, and where maxT = T is the time of
maturity. Irrespective of the particular structure of T, we assume that a(·) is adapted to
a filtration (Ft)t∈T that lives on a probability space (Ω,FT ,P). For convenience, assume
that a1(·) is a nume´raire, i.e. non-dividend paying and almost surely strictly positive.
Assume now that Q is an equivalent martingale measure (EMM) for the price process a(·),
i.e. by the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing, we assume that the market spanned
by a(·) is arbitrage-free. Furthermore, consider a payoff X at maturity T , given by a
random variable on (Ω,FT ,P). Assuming sufficient integrability, or even boundedness
where necessary, the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing implies that for t ∈ T the
risk-neutral valuation formula
X(t) = a1(t)EQ
[
X
a1(T )
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(64)
defines an arbitrage-free price process X(·) for the payoff X = X(T ) at T . Because of
Lebesgue-measurability, the implicit function Ψ in (48) is a vector of payoffs like X when
evaluated at maturity using a = a(T ). Therefore, if uniqueness of the solution of (16) –
(18) is given for all possible outcomes of a(T ), e.g. by part four of Theorem 2, then the
risk-neutral valuation formula
a1(t)EQ
[
Ψ(a(T ))
a1(T )
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(65)
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provides no-arbitrage prices of the equities and the liabilities of the considered system at
any time t ∈ T. While completeness of the market given by the underlying exogenous
assets’ price processes plays no role in this consideration, uniqueness of the no-arbitrage
prices at maturity (given any scenario for the underlying assets) is crucial. However,
uniqueness of equities’ and liabilities’ no-arbitrage prices at any time before maturity
naturally depends on the replicability of Ψ(a(T )) at maturity in terms of the exogenous
assets, which would be given in a generally complete market.
Regarding the balance sheet considerations of Sec. 4.3, it is clear that the accounting
equation (28) also holds when a, s, and the di are replaced by corresponding no-arbitrage
prices before maturity. This follows directly from the application of (64) to both sides of
(28).
Regarding the measures of leverage and cross-ownership in Sec. 4.4, similarly to the
balance sheet equation case, in (32) – (37) one could substitute a, s, and the di by
corresponding no-arbitrage prices before maturity. In general, this would lead to results
different from (43).
6.2 More exogenous assets than firms
So far we have assumed the exogenous assets to be given by a vector a ∈ (R+0 )
n, where
the dimension n is the number of firms considered in the system. This rather artificial
assumption, which was entirely sufficient for our considerations at maturity conditional on
one price scenario of the exogenous assets, can naturally be extended in the following way.
We assume that the exogenous assets are given by a vector a ∈ (R+0 )
q where q ∈ {1, 2, . . .}.
To describe the ownership of these assets we need an ownership matrix Ma ∈ Rn×q with
column sums in [0, 1]. Similar to the obvious change in the liquidation value (no-arbitrage
price) equations (16) – (18), which become
r1 = min
{
d1
r
1,...,rm,s,a, M
a · a+Ms · s+
m∑
i=1
Md,i · ri
}
(66)
For 0 < j < m:
rj+1 = min

dj+1r1,...,rm,s,a,
(
Ma · a+Ms · s +
m∑
i=1
Md,i · ri −
j∑
i=1
di
r
1,...,rm,s,a
)+
(67)
s =
(
Ma · a+Ms · s+
m∑
i=1
Md,i · ri −
m∑
i=1
di
r
1,...,rm,s,a
)+
, (68)
the theory as described so far stays exactly the same, or can be adapted in the entirely
obvious way by replacing a withMa ·a, including Theorem 2 and Section 6.1 on prices be-
fore maturity. However, using the extended set-up allows for even more general liabilities
(derivatives) due to di
r
1,...,rm,s
= di
r
1,...,rm,s,a
(cf. Eq. (15)). See Sec. 6.3 for an example.
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6.3 An example with stocks, bonds, and derivatives
Consider a system of two firms, n = 2, and three exogenous assets, a ∈ (R+0 )
3 and
Ma ∈ R2×3 (cf. Sec. 6.2). Suppose now for the liabilities (m = 3)
d1 =
(
b1
b3
)
, d2
a
=
(
b2
c2(0.5a1 + a3 − k2)
−
)
, d3
a
=
(
c1(a2 − k1)
+
0
)
, (69)
where b1, b2, b3, c1, c2, k1, k2 > 0. As in Assumption 1, let M
s,Md,i ∈ R2×2 (i = 1, 2, 3)
be strictly left substochastic matrices. The described system is one of two firms where
the first one has issued two bonds of differing seniority (that of nominal b1 higher than
that of b2), and one derivative – a European Call on exogenous asset a2 with a strike
price of k1 and a ‘size’ of c1. The second firm has issued one bond (nominal b3) and one
derivative – a European Put on a basket (a mix) of exogenous assets a1 and a3 with a
strike price of k2 and a ‘size’ of c2. Additionally, and not specified in more detail, any level
of cross-ownership of any of these five liabilities and the two equities could be present. It
is clear in this case that part four of Theorem 2 applies, with the unique no-arbitrage price
equilibrium given by Eq. (66) – (68). These no-arbitrage prices could be calculated using
the algorithm (62) of Sec. 5.2. Using risk-neutral pricing techniques under a stochastic
model for the exogenous assets (cf. Sec. 6.1), one could therefore simultaneously calculate
no-arbitrage prices of all claims (equities, loans, derivatives) in this system, while fully
accounting for the priority of claims, as well as for leverage and counterparty risk caused
by cross-ownership.
As a remark, in (69) the second entries of d2
a
and d3
a
could be swapped without any
consequences for pricing. Furthermore, it is clear in what way the above example would
simplify if one was only interested in the valuation of equity, bonds and derivatives of
differing seniority issued by one single firm, free of any cross-ownership entanglements.
6.4 No unique prices under Assumption 3
Suppose n = 2 and m = 1, Ms = 0 and
Md =
(
0 0.8
0.8 0
)
, dr,s =
(
(r2 − 2)
2
(r1 − 2)
2
)
, a =
(
1
1
)
. (70)
It can now easily be checked that the no-arbitrage equations
r1 = min{(r2 − 2)
2, 1 + 0.8r2} (71)
r2 = min{(r1 − 2)
2, 1 + 0.8r1} (72)
s1 = (1 + 0.8r2 − (r2 − 2)
2)+ (73)
s2 = (1 + 0.8r1 − (r1 − 2)
2)+. (74)
are solved by
r∗ =
(
1
1
)
and s∗ =
(
0.8
0.8
)
, (75)
as well as by
r∗ =
(
4
4
)
and s∗ =
(
0.2
0.2
)
. (76)
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Note that in this example (47) does not hold. For the theoretical meaning of this example
see also Sec. 4.7.
6.5 No price equilibrium under maximum cross-ownership
LetMs be a maximum ownership matrix in the sense that the matrix is left stochastic, that
is each column adds up to 1. Let ||a||1 > 0, d
i ≡ 0 and Md,i = 0 (i = 1, . . . , m). Suppose
now that a no-arbitrage equilibrium for this set-up exists. Because of the assumptions,
||s||1 = ||M
s · s||1. Under no-arbitrage, (29) holds. Therefore,
||s||1 = ||a||1 + ||M
s · s||1 = ||a||1 + ||s||1 , (77)
which is a contradiction since ||a||1 > 0. Also, since I
max = 1, one has Lmax = I
max
1−Imax
=
+∞.
6.6 Lmax is sharp
Consider a system with n = 2, m = 1, Md = 0, d = 0,
Ms =
(
0 0.5
0.5 0
)
, and a =
(
1
1
)
.
The no-arbitrage equations are
r = 0 (78)
s = (a+Ms · s)+. (79)
We therefore have Lmax = 1, and the upper boundary of the sum of all balance sheets is
(Lmax + 1)||a||1 = 4. It is clear from Theorem 2 that we have unique no-arbitrage prices
in this set-up. It can easily be checked against (78) and (79) that this price equilibrium
is given by r1 = r2 = 0 and s1 = s2 = 2, which means that the sum of all balance sheets
equals 4, which is the value of (Lmax + 1)||a||1. Hence, L
max is sharp.
7 Conclusion
This paper has presented a model for the no-arbitrage valuation of equities and general
liabilities in a system of firms where cross-ownership is present and where liabilities, that
can include debts and derivatives, can be of differing seniority in a liquidation. Cross-
ownership is a widespread financial phenomenon (cf. Sec. 1.3), and as the presented theory
directly accounts for counterparty risk and, in a way, systemic risk, its valuation procedure
should be relevant for the theory and practice of general asset valuation, derivatives
pricing, and credit risk management. For the application of the ideas of this paper, it
might be helpful that our theory is a direct extension of the Merton (1974) model (see
also Sec. 1.4), which is the basis of modern structural credit risk models. For instance,
the theory presented in this paper is general enough to be applied in stochastic interest
rates settings, in settings where underlying exogenous assets are modelled with copula
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approaches, and for credit risk modelling, where specifically defined default barriers could
be applied for the calculation of default probabilities. Future directions of research to
extend this theory should include investigations on the range of liabilities that allow for
unique no-arbitrage price equilibria (weaker forms of Assumption 4) and, of course, the
question of no-arbitrage pricing in the multi-period case.
A Appendix
A.1 A result for substochastic matrices
LEMMA 3. If M ∈ Rn×n is a strictly (left or right) substochastic matrix, then (I−M)−1
exists and is non-negative. The diagonal elements of (I−M)−1 are greater than or equal
to 1.
Proof. For ||M||1 < 1, it follows from standard results of functional analysis that (I−M)
−1
exists and
(I−M)−1 =
∞∑
n=0
Mn. (80)
The lemma then follows from Mn ≥ 0 for n = 0, 1, . . ., and M0 = I.
A.2 Two fixed point theorems
THEOREM 3 (Brouwer–Schauder Fixed Point Theorem). Every continuous function
from a convex compact subset K of a Banach space to K itself has a fixed point.
DEFINITION 1. Let (X, d) be a metric space. A map Φ : X → X is called a strict
contraction on X if there exists a number 0 ≤ c < 1 such that
d(Φ(x),Φ(y)) ≤ c · d(x,y) for x,y ∈ X. (81)
The map Φ is called a weak contraction if
d(Φ(x),Φ(y)) ≤ d(x,y) for x,y ∈ X. (82)
THEOREM 4 (Banach Contraction Mapping Theorem). Let X be a complete metric
space and f be a strict contraction on X. Then Φ has a unique fixed point x∗ ∈ X. For
any x ∈ X, one has
lim
n→∞
Φn(x) = lim
n→∞
Φ ◦ . . . ◦ Φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
(x) = x∗. (83)
A.3 Two lemmas
LEMMA 4. For x ∈ R, m ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, and y1, . . . , ym ∈ R+0 ,
x = min
{
y1, x
}
+
m−1∑
j=1
min

yj+1,
(
x−
j∑
i=1
yi
)+
 +
(
x−
m∑
i=1
yi
)+
. (84)
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Proof. This is easy to check.
LEMMA 5. For x, y1, y2 ∈ R and for monotonically increasing functions ψi : R → R+0
(i = 1, . . . , m) such that for any z1, z2 ∈ R with z1 ≥ z2
z1 − z2 ≥
m∑
i=1
(ψi(z1)− ψi(z2)) (85)
the following equation holds:
|y1 − y2| =
∣∣min{ψ1(y1), x+ y1}−min{ψ1(y2), x+ y2}∣∣ (86)
+
m−1∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣min

ψj+1(y1),
(
x+ y1 −
j∑
i=1
ψi(y1)
)+

− min

ψj+1(y2),
(
x+ y2 −
j∑
i=1
ψi(y2)
)+

∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣
(
x+ y1 −
m∑
i=1
ψi(y1)
)+
−
(
x+ y2 −
m∑
i=1
ψi(y2)
)+∣∣∣∣∣ .
Obviously, any of the functions ψi in Lemma 5 could be a constant.
Proof. We will prove the equation considering six cases (with sub-cases) for which we will
derive simplified expressions for the right hand side of (86). It will be fairly straightforward
to check that these expression are correct. Without loss of generality, assume y1 ≥ y2, and
hence ψi(y1) ≥ ψi(y2) (i = 1, . . . , m). Because of this, all absolute expressions | · | below
will be positive anyway. We keep the | · | for convenience. Regarding the aforementioned
cases, note that for y1 ≥ y2 and for j ≤ k, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, it is impossible to have a
situation where simultaneously
j∑
i=1
ψi(y1) ≥ x+ y1 (87)
k∑
i=1
ψi(y2) ≤ x+ y2. (88)
This becomes immediately clear from a subtraction of the two inequalities, (87)-(88),
which leads to a contradiction of (85):
y1 − y2 ≤
j∑
i=1
ψi(y1)−
k∑
i=1
ψi(y2) ≤
k∑
i=1
(ψi(y1)− ψi(y2)). (89)
We therefore only have to consider the following cases.
Case 1:
∑m
i=1 ψ
i(y1) ≤ x + y1 and
∑m
i=1 ψ
i(y2) ≤ x + y2 . In this case, using (85), the
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right side of (86) is identical to
m∑
i=1
∣∣ψi(y1)− ψi(y2)∣∣ +
∣∣∣∣∣x+ y1 −
m∑
i=1
ψi(y1)−
(
x+ y2 −
m∑
i=1
ψi(y2)
)∣∣∣∣∣ = |y1 − y2|
(90)
Case 2: Assume that m > k > 0 and
m∑
i=1
ψi(y1) ≤ x+ y1 (91)
and
k∑
i=1
ψi(y2) ≤ x+ y2 ≤
k+1∑
i=1
ψi(y2), (92)
which implies
0 ≤ x+ y2 −
k∑
i=1
ψi(y2) ≤ ψk+1(y2) ≤ ψk+1(y1). (93)
Case 2.1: k = m− 1. The right hand side of (86) becomes
m−1∑
i=1
∣∣ψi(y1)− ψi(y2)∣∣ +
∣∣∣∣∣ψm(y1)−
(
x+ y2 −
m−1∑
i=1
ψi(y2)
)∣∣∣∣∣ (94)
+
∣∣∣∣∣x+ y1 −
m∑
i=1
ψi(y1)
∣∣∣∣∣ (93)= |y1 − y2|.
Case 2.2: k ≤ m− 2. The right hand side of (86) turns into
k∑
i=1
∣∣ψi(y1)− ψi(y2)∣∣ +
∣∣∣∣∣ψk+1(y1)−
(
x+ y2 −
k∑
i=1
ψi(y2)
)∣∣∣∣∣ (95)
+ |ψk+2(y1)|+ . . .+ |ψm(y1)| +
∣∣∣∣∣x+ y1 −
m∑
i=1
ψi(y1)
∣∣∣∣∣ (93)= |y1 − y2|.
Case 3: Assume that m > j ≥ k > 0 and
j∑
i=1
ψi(y1) ≤ x+ y1 ≤
j+1∑
i=1
ψi(y1) (96)
as well as
k∑
i=1
ψi(y2) ≤ x+ y2 ≤
k+1∑
i=1
ψi(y2), (97)
which again implies
0 ≤ x+ y2 −
k∑
i=1
ψi(y2) ≤ ψk+1(y2) ≤ ψk+1(y1). (98)
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Case 3.1: j = k. The right hand side of (86) becomes
k∑
i=1
∣∣ψi(y1)− ψi(y2)∣∣ +
∣∣∣∣∣x+ y1 −
k∑
i=1
ψi(y1)−
(
x+ y2 −
k∑
i=1
ψi(y2)
)∣∣∣∣∣ (99)
(85)
= |y1 − y2|.
Case 3.2: j = k + 1. The right hand side of (86) turns into
k∑
i=1
∣∣ψi(y1)− ψi(y2)∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣ψk+1(y1)−
(
x+ y2 −
k∑
i=1
ψi(y2)
)∣∣∣∣∣ (100)
+
∣∣∣∣∣x+ y1 −
k+1∑
i=1
ψi(y1)
∣∣∣∣∣ (98)= |y1 − y2|.
Case 3.3: j ≥ k + 2. The right hand side of (86) becomes
k∑
i=1
∣∣ψi(y1)− ψi(y2)∣∣ +
∣∣∣∣∣ψk+1(y1)−
(
x+ y2 −
k∑
i=1
ψi(y2)
)∣∣∣∣∣ (101)
+ |ψk+2(y1)|+ . . .+ |ψj(y1)| +
∣∣∣∣∣x+ y1 −
j∑
i=1
ψi(y1)
∣∣∣∣∣ (98)= |y1 − y2|.
Case 4: Assume m > j > 0 and
j∑
i=1
ψi(y1) ≤ x+ y1 ≤
j+1∑
i=1
ψi(y1) (102)
as well as
x+ y2 ≤ ψ1(y2). (103)
The right hand side of (86) turns into
|ψ1(y1)− (x+ y2)|+ |ψ2(y1)|+ . . .+ |ψj(y1)|+
∣∣∣∣∣x+ y1 −
j∑
i=1
ψi(y1)
∣∣∣∣∣ = |y1− y2|. (104)
Case 5: Assume
∑m
i=1 ψ
i(y1) ≤ x + y1 and x + y2 ≤ ψ1(y2). The right hand side of (86)
turns into
|ψ1(y1)− (x+ y2)|+ |ψ2(y1)|+ . . .+ |ψm(y1)|+
∣∣∣∣∣x+ y1 −
m∑
i=1
ψi(y1)
∣∣∣∣∣ = |y1− y2|. (105)
Case 6: Assume x+y1 ≤ ψ1(y1) and x+y2 ≤ ψ1(y2). The right hand side of (86) becomes
|(x+ y1)− (x+ y2)| = |y1 − y2|. (106)
The proof for y1 ≤ y2 follows immediately from swapping y1 and y2 with each other in
(86).
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